118. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Washington Special Actions Group1
SUBJECT
- Southeast Asia Dry Season Campaign
PARTICIPANTS
- Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
- State
- U. Alexis Johnson
- Defense
- David Packard
- Daniel Z. Henkin
- CIA
- Richard Helms
- JCS
- Admiral Thomas Moorer
- NSC Staff
- Brig. Gen. A. M. Haig
- Colonel Richard T. Kennedy
- WH Staff
- H. R. Haldeman
- Ronald L. Ziegler
Mr. Kissinger: How can we lift the embargo at least partially and how can we relate the Phase I operation to Chup?
Mr. Johnson: (Reads message from Berger—Tab B in meeting book.2) State went back Flash to Berger asking then to go with scenario we earlier recommended.3 The information is already moving from Saigon, thus it doesn’t matter. We should go ahead with briefings to Congress this afternoon.
Mr. Kissinger: The President wants to keep the specifics of our participation down. He wants no numbers—only general statement. Low level people should do the briefing. We must avoid a crisis atmosphere. [Page 348] It should be portrayed as an SVN operation in the old sanctuary areas. We are only doing what they can’t do. It must be kept in low key.
Mr. Johnson: I think it should be done by only Defense and State Congressional liaison people with no White House or military briefers. [All agree.]
Mr. Kissinger: They can start any time after this meeting.
Mr. Helms: Stennis called this morning for general briefing on Southeast Asia.
Mr. Kissinger: I would call it off if you can. Stennis is not aware of these operations.
Mr. Helms: It would have nothing to do with these operations.
Mr. Kissinger: O.K.
Mr. Helms: The briefing gives general background including enemy supply information.
Mr. Kissinger: What do briefers say when asked if there is anything else?
Mr. Johnson: What can they say?
Mr. Henkin: Rely on the Military Region I briefings. All on these lists were briefed on Military Region I.
Mr. Kissinger: The Secretary of State called Fulbright and Aiken.
Mr. Packard: Then they say this is all we have to give you—you already have been briefed on MR-1.
Mr. Kissinger: There should be No Comment on the projected length of the Chup operation. It will fall from the papers quickly. Can we get SVN to limit American newsmen?
Admiral Moorer: It would be better to let the water seek its own level.
Mr. Kissinger: Is there anything more on Chup?
Admiral Moorer: There is a message from Swank—he is concerned that he and Lon Nol are not informed.4
Mr. Johnson: The question of whether they were informed or not is not so important. The real question is does FANK know?
Admiral Moorer: The Cambodians know. We asked the question of Abrams—but they don’t get into the operation until Phase II of Chup. This may be a disconnect.
Mr. Kissinger: Who briefed the Cambodians?
[Page 349]
Admiral Moorer: Tri briefed them.
Mr. Kissinger: Can’t we get Berger and Abrams to Thieu and Swank to Lon Nol? Maybe Lon Nol doesn’t want to make a statement.
Mr. Packard: He probably doesn’t want to look as though he has to call on the SVN for help.
Mr. Kissinger: Can’t we send MACV officers to brief Swank and possibly the FANK?
Admiral Moorer: I will work this out with Alex Johnson.
[Omitted here is discussion of the public relations aspects of the operations in which the group agreed to lift the embargo on the media’s release of information on Phase I of the Laos operation once the announcement on Chup was made in Saigon at 3:30 a.m., February 4, Washington time.] [5 minute recess at 1500 hrs. Henkin & Ziegler leave. Meeting reconvenes at 1510.]Mr. Kissinger: PRG says in Paris that they will fight on even if we enter Laos. They are always willing to show good will, however. Not let’s turn to the scenario for Tchepone.
Mr. Kissinger: We will notify Thieu immediately of the execute order when the decision is made. Why should we tell Souvanna ahead?
Mr. Johnson: Godley wants a “no comment” answer on the question of Souvanna consultations. The problem is to keep him protected. We have the 1962 accords and are assisting the SVN invasion without having let Souvanna know. We have to frame the U Thant letter carefully and should let Souvanna know so he can be as consistent as possible.5 Maybe, therefore, we do have to get to him early.
Mr. Kissinger: Would we inform him by official communication or through Godley privately?
Mr. Johnson: There is no advantage to the informal approach. We can separate the contingency letter approach without telling him.
Mr. Kissinger: How will we deal with Souvanna publicly? We can’t say “no comment” because that means yes. What do we say?
Mr. Helms: There is no way except to stand up to a white lie. Couldn’t we find some language which is not entirely untrue.
Mr. Kissinger: I think we all agree that we cannot reply he was consulted.
[Page 350]
Mr. Packard: We have to say that we told him and regret that this action was necessary.
Mr. Johnson: This is a really serious problem.
Mr. Kissinger: The President has agreed to consult with Stennis.6
[Omitted here is discussion of the schedule for diplomatic, Congressional, and public notifications on the Tchepone operation. The group agreed that congressional consultations would begin on Sunday, February 7, except for the one with Senator Stennis. Kissinger noted that Nixon wanted “no high key reaction” in Washington, so the group agreed that no one would appear on television. They also agreed to allow Rogers and Laird to jointly appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10 and for Laird to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee if requested. Finally, Johnson volunteered to prepare a contingency study on what to do if Souvanna were overthrown.]